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Companies normally make decisions to maximize their proﬁts, so managers would not be expected to
accept projects that harm their ﬁrm’s economic performance. However, when managers of state-owned enter-
prises (hereafter, SOEs) make decisions about employment, they tend to hire more people than necessary,
because these entities are especially established by the government to enhance the country’s rate of employ-
ment (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Boycko et al., 1996; Dong and Putterman, 2001). Although a number
of studies (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Dong and Putterman, 2003) have demonstrated that political pres-
sure or government intervention causes excess employment in SOEs, previous researchers do not clearly
explain the connection between government intervention and overstaﬃng. In this study, we attempt to ﬁll this
void.
Our study addresses questions such as how governments intervene in corporations and by what mechanism
governments inﬂuence SOEs to employ extra people. We consider that politicians may choose to focus their
interventions on SOEs because it is much more costly for them to interfere in private ﬁrms. Boycko et al.
(1996) argue that politicians cause government-owned ﬁrms to employ a surplus of workers. Similarly,
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) ﬁnd that government-sponsored ﬁrms tend to use more labor than their
private-sector counterparts, because private ﬁrms are more diﬃcult for governments to inﬂuence. Also, it
has already been proven that appointing corporate executives who have a government background is an
eﬀective way for the government to inﬂuence SOEs. The power of politicians to appoint SOE chairmen and
to control costs or rewards for businesses open up opportunities for governments to exert direct inﬂuence
on SOEs (Tenev et al., 2002). More importantly, we argue that most SOE executives are motivated to earn more
money and gain more opportunities for promotion, and these motives can lead them to facilitate government
priorities.
Political connections are considered a very important factor inﬂuencing the way ﬁrms perform (Fan et al.,
2007) and the question naturally arises as to whether political connections aﬀect company employment deci-
sions. There are several reasons why China provides a natural laboratory for examining the eﬀects of political
connections on ﬁrm behavior. (1) State ownership is prevalent and the state sector is far from homogeneous,
as most SOEs are controlled either by the central government or local governments (provincial or county
level). (2) The government maintains heavy control over the economy and it often uses SOEs to serve political
and social objectives, such as reducing unemployment or ﬁscal deﬁcits. (3) The market for chairmen is under-
developed in China, with many managers possessing close political ties to local and central governments but
lacking professional qualiﬁcations or managerial experience.
Therefore, we predict that examining the political connections of SOEs may provide answers for our ques-
tions concerning appointed chairmen and company employment policies. We investigate these possibilities
further by examining a sample of local SOEs and considering a new determinant of overstaﬃng that previous
studies have not explored.
Although we mainly focus on the eﬀect of chairmen with government backgrounds on excess staﬃng, we
address several other issues as well. Particularly, we investigate whether overstaﬃng adversely aﬀects corpo-
rate performance (Li and Liang, 1998; Xu et al., 2005; Zeng and Chen, 2006; Xue and Bai, 2008). We ask what
beneﬁts a corporation will receive if it hires more people than it really needs. Lin and Tan (1999) show that
ﬁrms that practice overstaﬃng receive compensation in the form of lower taxes, more government grants and
preferential treatment in competition for contracts. We expect that the problems of overstaﬃng may result
from an exchange of beneﬁts between ﬁrms and the government. If a ﬁrm agrees to employ redundant work-
ers, then that ﬁrm will enjoy opportunities for easy access to bank loans and grants or preferential tax treat-
ment. The ﬁrm receives such beneﬁts, but do the ﬁrms’ executives gain any beneﬁts? Another concern of our
study is to determine whether corporate executives, especially chairmen, receive promotions or higher pay for
supporting excess employees.
To answer these questions, we manually collect detailed information on the chairmen of all of the local
SOEs listed in A-share markets in China from 2004 to 2009. This information includes the chairmen’s past
employment records, including any background they may have in government. We classify a company as
being politically connected if its chairman is a current or an ex-government oﬃcial. Then we compare
the hiring practices of politically connected companies with those of other companies. Our ﬁndings are
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ically connected chairmen has a signiﬁcant positive relationship with excess employment by local SOEs. We
consistently ﬁnd that the overstaﬃng problems in ﬁrms run by politically connected chairmen are more seri-
ous than in ﬁrms that are otherwise similar. Second, our analysis of the economic consequences from such
political inﬂuence shows two main eﬀects. The evidence indicates that local SOEs with chairmen who have
government backgrounds receive more bank loans and more government grants than those without such a
political connection. However, we ﬁnd no evidence that excess staﬃng is positively related to debt ﬁnancing
or to government subsidies. Also, we ﬁnd that excess employment is negatively related to the chairman’s
prospects for promotion, which is contrary to our prediction. Concerning the chairman’s compensation,
a ﬁrm’s overstaﬃng has a negative eﬀect on its chairman’s total compensation, but a positive eﬀect on
the chairman’s relative compensation.
To better understand the overstaﬃng problem of China’s local SOEs, our study (1) performs additional
analysis on the connections between excess employment and ﬁrm performance (or labor costs), and (2)
investigates how the social objectives of politicians inﬂuence the appointment of politically connected
CEOs.
By controlling for other factors that inﬂuence ﬁrm performance (labor costs), we ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s scale of
overstaﬃng is negatively related to its accounting performance and positively related (to a signiﬁcant degree)
to its total labor costs. Finally, a listed company’s chairman is more likely to be politically connected when the
company belongs to a region with a lower per capita GDP and a higher unemployment rate.
Our study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the evidence from this research enriches our
understanding by showing how the appointment of chairmen with government backgrounds helps the govern-
ment to promote overstaﬃng by SOEs. Prior studies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Dong and Putterman, 2003;
Lin and Tan, 1999) have focused on government interventions that aﬀect excess employment. However, we
concentrate on how governments actually inﬂuence corporations to hire more people. We ﬁnd that appointing
politically connected chairmen is the main mechanism through which the government intervenes in ﬁrms to
promote the hiring of more employees.
Second, our paper adds to a growing literature that explores the eﬀects of political connections on business.
Political connections are already considered an important factor in the valuation of ﬁrms (Fisman, 2001;
Johnson and Mitton, 2003), in company performance (Fan et al., 2007) and in mode of operations (Bertrand
et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008). However, the question of whether or how the political
connections of company chairmen aﬀect excess employment is not well explored. One of the few studies -
examining this issue is that of Liu et al. (2010). Using cross-sectional data, these authors ﬁnd that the eﬀect
of political connections on employee allocation eﬃciency is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s ultimate controller.
However, Liu et al. (2010) do not examine the economic consequences of excess employment. This study
attempts to ﬁll this void in the literature and examine the eﬀects of excess employment on ﬁrms in greater
depth.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on how government policy aﬀects business in general. The
evidence from our paper supports both the “grabbing hand” model (showing how politicians can intervene at
the expense of business activities) and the “helping hand’ model (showing how politicians can provide privi-
leges and beneﬁts to corporations) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). We consider government pressure for excess
employment as a typical example of the “grabbing hand” and compensatory bank loans or government sub-
sidies as examples of the “helping hand.”
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior literature and develops the
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables, and outlines the econometric speciﬁcations. Section 4
presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 empirically tests the hypotheses and reports the results.
Section 6 provides conclusions.
2. Institutional background and hypotheses
In this section, we discuss the institutional background of China’s business environment and develop our
hypotheses regarding the eﬀects of political connections on excess employment and on the economic conse-
quences of the overstaﬃng problem.
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During the economic reforms of the 1980s, the Chinese government launched a program allowing bureau-
crats to quit their government positions and join the business community, a phenomenon that later came to be
known as “xiahai” (jumping into the sea). Starting in the mid-1980s, many government agencies began to
establish business entities and many bureaucrats became managers of these businesses (Li, 1998). Although
these ex-bureaucrats have oﬃcially quit the government, they still keep good relations with their friends or
ex-colleagues in government. These ties help to keep government and business linked together.
As a relationship-based transitional economy, Chinese society is pervaded by the ubiquitous phenomenon
of guanxi (or relationships). The word describes a subset of Chinese personal connections in which one indi-
vidual is able to prevail upon another to perform a favor or service (Chung and Hamilton, 2002). Political
connections are one type of “guanxi.” The state gives preferential treatment to ﬁrms with political connections
and uses its political power to intervene in the ﬁrms’ operations or corporate governance.
As the promotion of regional oﬃcials to higher-ranking positions depends largely on their region’s eco-
nomic growth, or GDP, these oﬃcials have an interest in keeping regional rates of development and employ-
ment high during their periods in oﬃce (Li and Zhou, 2005). Therefore, oﬃcials at all levels of government
have an incentive to intervene in SOEs and use these ﬁrms to help solve political and social problems.
2.2. Hypotheses development
In this section, we develop our hypotheses concerning the relationships between excess employment in local
SOEs and the government backgrounds of SOE chairmen.
2.2.1. Chairman’s government background and excess employment
A series of studies beginning with Roberts (1990) point out that political connections in corporations are a
worldwide phenomenon in both developing and developed countries. However, such connections are more
common in countries that are perceived as highly corrupt or that impose restrictions on foreign investments
by their citizens, than in countries with more transparent systems (Faccio, 2006).
What are the causes of political relations in business? There are two explanations. First, concerning the gov-
ernment’s “helping hand,” political connections are a kind of reputation-building mechanism (Luo and Zhen,
2008). Firms take this mechanism as a kind of social resource, with which they can seek beneﬁts or rents
directly from the authorities (Michelson, 2007; Yu et al., 2010). Second, in view of the government’s “grabbing
hand,” political connections are a substitute for the presently ﬂawed institutions in transitional countries. If a
company has a good political connection with the government, it can eﬀectively defend itself against infringe-
ments that the authorities seek to impose on companies. A number of recent studies (Chen et al., 2005; Faccio,
2006; Li et al., 2006; Yu and Pan, 2008) suggest that private ﬁrms are far more likely to participate in political
aﬀairs in countries with high levels of corruption and low levels of property protection (Chen et al., 2005;
Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2006). Under conditions of discriminative policies, private entrepreneurs search for
new approaches to protect themselves. Many company managers feel it has been proven that keeping a close
connection with the government is the most eﬀective means of self-protection. Obviously, this view emphasizes
the role of political connections for resisting the government’s “grabbing hand.” However, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s pressure to hire extra employees is a typical instance of the grabbing hand, because overstaﬃng
results in higher labor costs and worsens ﬁrm performance. Some ﬁrms might hope that political connections
will protect them from such pressure, but we argue that excess employment has a negative relationship with
political connections.
Although theoretical analysis suggests that political connections negatively aﬀect a ﬁrm’s scale of overstaf-
ﬁng, there is little empirical evidence for this argument. A few empirical studies examine the relationship
between political connections and excess employment and show that politically connected corporations
undertake too many tasks for politicians (Bertrand et al., 2006). Business managers do this because politi-
cians require their closely connected ﬁrms to help solve unemployment problems by hiring extra workers
(Bennedsen, 2000; Yuan, 2011).
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iﬁcation. In what kinds of ﬁrms is the government likely to interfere? Also, through what kinds of political
connections can the government most eﬀectively intervene?
Prior studies have already provided us the answer to the ﬁrst question. Local governments often choose to
intervene in SOEs (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Boycko et al., 1996). These researchers believe that SOEs are
much more easily inﬂuenced by government intervention and much more likely to pursue social objectives
rather than maximizing proﬁts. As it is more costly for the government to intervene in private ﬁrms, SOEs
usually sustain a much greater burden of overstaﬃng than other ﬁrms (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Zeng
and Chen, 2006).
As to the second question concerning the means of intervention, recent studies show that appointing people
with government backgrounds as SOE chairmen helps politicians to achieve their employment goals. In
China’s gradual process of SOE reform, the government still ﬁrmly controls appointments and dismissals
of key personnel in these companies (Qian, 1995). Although each listed ﬁrm has a board of directors, the
chairmen of SOEs are generally nominated by the government and then rubber-stamped by the board. These
chairmen, especially those who have political connections, enjoy the same promotion and compensation mech-
anisms as politicians. Like politicians, they are aﬀected by their region’s performance in various political and
social objectives. They feel it is important to improve the employment rate under their jurisdiction. In conclu-
sion, through appointing politically connected chairmen, the government achieves its intervention for excess
employment by local SOEs.
The above analysis leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Local SOEs with chairmen who have a government background are more likely to support
excess employment.2.2.2. Economic consequences of excess employment: ﬁrm/chairman level
If a chairman who has a government background does not gain any personal beneﬁts, why would he vol-
untarily act as the link for government intervention in promoting excess employment? If the government does
not compensate local SOEs for their losses from overstaﬃng, why would these ﬁrms employ more people? We
predict that an exchange of beneﬁts exists among local governments, chairmen and local SOEs.
Concerning the chairman, it may be that he is willing to help the government intervene in his ﬁrm in
exchange for higher pay or more promotion opportunities (Brickley et al., 1999; Gillan et al., 2009). How-
ever, Cao et al. (2012) ﬁnd that CEOs with a higher likelihood of political promotion have lower pay levels,
which shows that political promotion could be a substitute for pay. Chairmen are judged by their ﬁrm’s eco-
nomic performance, but the promotion and the compensation of politically connected chairmen are more
aﬀected by their performance toward various political and economical goals such as growth in GDP or
the employment rate (Liu, 2005). If a chairman is interested in political promotion, then he exhibits a poli-
tician’s objective function: he tries his best to cater to the will of the government (Zhang, 1999; Chen et al.,
2008).
Consequently, if a politically connected chairman facilitates the government’s agenda for overstaﬃng, we
expect there is a reward of promotion or higher pay for the chairman. We also expect that the relationship
between excess employment and the chairmen’s promotions (or compensation levels) will be strongest in polit-
ically related ﬁrms.
In terms of the ﬁrm, local SOEs may receive some policy favors for supporting excess employment. Prior
studies conclude that redundant employees cause either increased labor costs (Zeng and Chen, 2006) or
decreased ﬁrm performance (Li and Liang, 1998; Xu et al., 2005). If the government does not grant these ﬁrms
some beneﬁts, the ﬁrms may sustain losses and suﬀer severe ﬁnancial problems in the short run. Hence, ﬁrms
with redundant employees request the government to oﬀer some policy favors. Consistent with this argument,
Lin and Tan (1999) demonstrate theoretically that in exchange for supporting redundant workers, the enter-
prises bargain with the government for ex ante policy favors, such as low-interest loans, tax reductions, tariﬀ
protections, legal monopolies, and so on. Furthermore, an empirical study by Xue and Bai (2008) uses Chinese
data and ﬁnds that ﬁrms with redundant workers receive more government subsidies.
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tional countries. Chen (2003) and Bertrand et al. (2006) show that politicians give aid to politically connected
ﬁrms. Similarly, Wu et al. (2009) demonstrate that chairmen with experience working in government have a
positive relationship with the authorities and smaller tax expenses. Empirical evidence (Johnson and Mitton,
2003; Faccio, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008) indicates that politically connected ﬁrms have greater access to debt
ﬁnancing than their non-connected peers.
Therefore, we argue that if local SOEs take on excess employees, they may be compensated for their
expenses by gaining preferential access to ﬁnancing and government subsidies. Additionally, a chairman’s gov-
ernment background will strengthen the positive political connection, allowing more debt ﬁnancing or grants.
The above analysis leads to our second hypothesis, which is expressed in two parts:
Hypothesis 2A. Chairmen in ﬁrms with excess employment are more likely to receive higher pay or
promotions, and this likelihood is higher if the chairman has a government background.
Hypothesis 2B. Firms with excess employment are more likely to have better access to debt ﬁnancing or gov-
ernment subsidies, and this likelihood is higher if the chairman has a government background.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection
To test these hypotheses, we restrict our focus to A-share local SOEs listed on China’s stock markets, whose
ultimate owners did not change from 2004 to 2009. Our sample period begins in 2004 because it was not until
this year that the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) explicitly required listed corporations to
disclose their executives’ work experience in annual reports, including CEOs’ biographical proﬁles, from
which we can obtain information about chairmen’s government backgrounds. Also, listed ﬁrms began to for-
mally disclose their ultimate controllers in annual reports starting in 2004.
Our study calls for identifying local SOEs according to the identity of their ultimate controllers.
The information on SOE controllers is gathered from the CCER China stocks database, which pro-
vides detailed information on the ownership of China’s ten largest shareholders and the ultimate
shareholders of stock market-listed ﬁrms. The CCER classiﬁes ﬁrms into the following three types:
(1) local SOEs that are owned by various local governments, (2) central SOEs that are owned by
the central government, and (3) non-state ﬁrms (or private ﬁrms), whose ultimate owners are non-
government units such as individual entrepreneurs. In this study, we mainly focus on local SOEs.
We diﬀerentiate between central and local SOEs because they are aﬀected diﬀerently by diﬀerent levels
of government.
We manually collect the chairmen’s information from the CSMAR ﬁnancial database, which provides
detailed information including age, gender, education, professional background and employment history on
most corporate executives. We also examine the credibility of this personal information through Internet
searches. According to each CEO’s proﬁle information, we traced their political connections by examining
whether he/she is currently or was formerly a government oﬃcial.
The accounting and ﬁnancial data of listed ﬁrms was also obtained from the CSMAR database. For
our tests, we need lagged ﬁrm performance information, so this data starts from 2003. Within the sam-
ple, ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industry sector are excluded because their accounting measurements diﬀerent
from those of others. Furthermore, ﬁrms listed in the province of Xizang are also excluded because their
macroeconomic data is not completely disclosed. We also exclude ﬁrms with fewer than 200 employees
according to Zeng and Chen (2006). Finally, we also exclude ﬁrms with missing data on necessary
variables.
For our tests of chairmen’s government backgrounds and ﬁrms’ excess employment, data on unemploy-
ment rates and per capita GDP for diﬀerent regions in our sample period are retrieved from the China
Statistical Year Book.
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To test our hypotheses, we use the following three regression models. Model (1) tests the relationship
between politically connected chairmen and their ﬁrms’ excess employment for H1. Then models (2) and
(3) test the economic consequences of excess employment for H2A and H2B, respectively.Exc Lit ¼ aþ b1Politicalit or Gov Politicalit þ b02Controlsit þ eit ð1Þ
Payit or Promotionit ¼ aþ b1Gov Politicalit þ b2Exc Lit þ b3Gov Politicalit  Exc Lit
þ b04Controlsit þ eit ð2Þ
Debtit or Subsidyit ¼ aþ b1Gov Politicalit þ b2Exc Lit þ b3Gov Politicalit  Exc Lit
þ b04Controlsit þ eit ð3Þ
where i denotes the sample ﬁrm and t denotes the year in the sample period.
3.2.1. Dependent and independent variables for model (1)
Excess employment (Exc_L), the dependent variable, is calculated as follows. According to the Jones model
system, we use the following expectation model suggested by prior studies (Zeng and Chen, 2006) to control
for the determinants of ﬁrm’s employees, for each ﬁrm i in year t:Act Lit ¼ aþ b1Sizeit þ b2AssetsGrowthit þ b3SalesGrowthit þ b4FixedAssetsit þ eit ð4Þ
where Act_L is the number of employees at the end of a ﬁscal year divided by the millions of dollars of ﬁrm
sales, Size is the logarithmic transformation of total sales, AssetGrowth is the growth ratio of capital invest-
ment, SalesGrowth is the growth ratio of sales and FixedAssets is ﬁxed assets divided by total assets.
Ordinary least squares is used to obtain estimates of a, b1, b2, b3 and b4 respectively. Then we deﬁne the
prediction error as excess employment and construct two variables to measure excess employment. The ﬁrst
variable is Exc_L, which equals the prediction error if it is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. The second variable
is Exc_L_Dummy, which equals 1 if it is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. We run a Tobit regression for the ﬁrst
measurement and a logistic regression for the likelihood of ﬁrms’ excess employment.
Political connection (Political), the explanatory variable in Hypothesis 1, equals 1 if the chairman of the
ﬁrm is a current or former government oﬃcial, and 0 otherwise. To particularly examine the special role that
the chairman plays in a ﬁrm’s excess employment, we employ a variable, Gov_Political. If the ﬁrm’s chairman
is or ever was the head of the industry that his or her ﬁrm belongs to, the variable Gov_Political equals 1. This
rating would apply, for instance, if a ﬁrm is classiﬁed in the textile industry and its chairman has worked as
head of the government’s department of textiles.
Following the example of prior studies on excess employment (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Xue and
Bai, 2008), we include variables in the model controlling for size, asset growth, sales growth, asset structure,
performance, leverage and ﬁrm age. We also control for chairman duality, the stock percentage of the largest
shareholder and regional institutional variables such as per capita GDP, unemployment rate and marketiza-
tion index. To control for industry and year eﬀects, industry and year dummies are also included.
3.2.2. Dependent and independent variables for model (2)
Pay and Promotion are the dependent variables in this model. DirectorPay1 is a continuous variable for the
chairman’s compensation. We deﬁne this variable as the logarithm of the chairman’s compensation. As the
compensation data for each chairman is not completely disclosed, we use the compensation of the ﬁrm’s
top three managers to proxy for it. We also employ another proxy variable (DirectorPay2) to measure chair-
men’s compensation. Here, DirectorPay2 = Ln (top three manager’s compensation/employees total
compensation).
Promotion is a dichotomous measure for chairman promotion, which equals 1 when there is a promotion
for the chairman of the ﬁrm i in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Drawing from previous research (Wang and Wang, 2007; Fang, 2009), we include the following control
variables in the model: managerial ownership, chairman’s age and tenure, chairman-CEO duality and the
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performance. Finally, year and industry dummies are also included.
3.2.3. Dependent and independent variables for model (3)
Debt and Subsidy are the two dependent variables in this model. Following prior studies (Faccio et al.,
2006; Yu and Pan, 2008), we employ three measures to capture debt ﬁnancing: (1) Debt1, or debt maturity
(deﬁned as long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt divided by total debts); (2) Debt2, or
short-term debt ratio (calculated as short-term debt divided by total assets); and (3) Debt3, or long-term debt
ratio (calculated as long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt divided by total assets).
To examine the eﬀect of excess employment on the receipt of government subsidies, we introduce the var-
iable Subsidy. Government subsidies are calculated as the sum of direct government subsidies, ﬁnancial
refunds and tax refunds from the ﬁnancial statements of the listed ﬁrms, divided by total assets (or net
income).
For model (3), besides ﬁrm characteristics and year dummies, we control for diﬀerent variables in debt and
subsidy regressions. In the debt model, we include an industry variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is in a monop-
olized industry (e.g., electric power, telecommunication, etc.), and 0 otherwise. In the subsidy model, we
include marketization indexes according to Yu et al. (2010).
The deﬁnitions of the regression variables are provided in Appendix A.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
4.1. Deﬁnition of politically connected chairmen
There are various deﬁnitions of “political connections.” Siegel (2007) deﬁnes all CEOs who are from the
same region as the president as politically connected CEOs. Others deﬁne CEOs who are friends, former col-
leagues and relatives of incumbent bureaucrats as politically connected CEOs (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and
Mitton, 2003). However, in our paper, based on the analysis in Section 2.2.1 and on prior studies (Bertrand
et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007), we deﬁne politically connected CEOs as CEOs who are former bureaucrats.
More speciﬁcally, this study focuses on ﬁrms’ chairmen. We deﬁne chairmen with government backgrounds
as chairmen who have government experience in the same industry in which they are now working.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides a description of the sample. Panel A of Table 1 presents the number of politically con-
nected chairmen of listed local SOEs between 2004 and 2009. This panel shows that the number of chairmen
with government backgrounds is similar across this period and approximately 35.27% of the chairmen in our
sample have political connections with the government. This suggests that the government maintains direct
inﬂuence in a signiﬁcant portion of ﬁrms through appointing politically connected chairmen. In the subsample
of political connections (1040 observations), 601 ﬁrms or 57.79%, have chairmen with government
backgrounds.
Panel B reports the distribution of politically connected ﬁrms in diﬀerent industry sectors, with the industry
categories classiﬁed by the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission). These results show that of the
1040 observations of ﬁrms with political connections, 94 are in the natural resources sector, 125 in the services
and trade sector, 443 in the manufacturing sector, 65 in the public utilities sector and 116 in the transportation
sector. Although the proportion of chairmen with political connections is similar across industries, there are
relatively more politically connected chairmen in the manufacturing industries. Panel B also presents the per-
centage of chairmen with government backgrounds in these politically connected ﬁrms across industries. We
can see from the table that in the agriculture, manufacturing, electric power, transportation, retail and utility
industry sectors, over half of the corporations have chairmen with government backgrounds.
Table 2 provides the mean, standard deviation (std. dev.), minimum value (Min.), and maximum value
(Max.) of the continuous variables for the subsample where ﬁrm chairmen are politically connected. The mean
value for Exc_L is 0.49, suggesting that the average number of excess employees for every 1 million in sales is
Table 1
Numbers of politically connected chairmen.
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Panel A Distribution of ﬁrms by year
Local SOEs 466 487 486 501 506 503 2949
Without political connection 299 320 311 321 328 330 1909
With political connection 167 167 175 180 178 173 1040
Proportion (%) 35.84 34.29 36.01 35.93 35.18 34.39 35.27
Government background 99 103 102 105 98 94 601
Proportion (%) 59.28 61.68 58.29 58.33 55.06 54.34 57.79
Industry Government background Political connection Total Government background (%)
Panel B Distribution of ﬁrms by industry
Farming 17 12 29 58.62
Mining 7 10 17 41.18
Manufacturing 257 186 443 58.01
Electric power 65 29 94 69.15
Construction 10 13 23 43.48
Transportation 75 41 116 64.66
Information technology 1 12 13 7.69
Wholesale and retail 89 36 125 71.20
Real estate 21 20 41 51.22
Social service 44 21 65 67.69
Culture 0 10 10 0.00
Integrated industry 15 49 64 23.44
Total 601 439 1040 57.79
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Exc_L 1040 0.4937 1.1004 0 7.0947
Debt1 1040 0.2592 0.1644 0 0.8495
Debt2 1040 0.1694 0.1312 0 0.7843
Subsidy1 1040 0.0059 0.0102 0.0000 0.0526
Subsidy2 1040 0.3269 0.8588 0.2645 5.3520
DirectorPay1 1040 12.3351 0.8207 9.5598 14.9106
DirectorPay2 1040 5.9251 5.1851 0.7427 25.3311
Marindex 1040 8.5998 1.9019 3.1 11.71
Govindex 1040 9.1930 1.1282 4.86 10.65
Lawindex 1040 8.1356 3.6824 1.53 16.61
FixedAsset 1040 0.3417 0.2031 0.0042 0.9599
AssetGrowth 1040 0.0601 0.0630 0.0000 0.6022
SaleSize 1040 21.0923 1.1498 15.6033 24.5475
SaleGrowth 1040 0.1609 0.3199 0.4032 1.4294
Leverage 1040 0.5149 0.1854 0.1430 0.8779
ExistAge 1040 12.7971 3.8384 5 29
FirstShare 1040 40.6724 15.2121 10 84.85
Mshare 1040 0.0002 0.0011 0 0.0192
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the top and bottom 2%.
Table 3 reports the mean and median values of the dependent variables for the sub-samples distinguished
by Gov_Political, as well as test statistics for diﬀerences in the mean and median values between the subsam-
ples. We ﬁrst examine the statistics of Exc_L. Consistent with hypothesis 1, we ﬁnd that for ﬁrms with a polit-
ical connection the mean of excess employment is 0.557 per 1 million sales, but only 0.4071 for ﬁrms whose
Table 3
Mean and median tests.
Variables Government background (Yes) Government background (No) T Wilcoxon
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Statistics Z
Exc_L 601 0.557 0 439 0.4071 0 2.1749** 1.192
Debt1 601 0.264 0.2624 439 0.2526 0.2552 1.1012 1.174
Debt2 601 0.1721 0.1527 439 0.1658 0.1508 0.7638 0.409
Subsidy1 601 0.0061 0.0022 439 0.0056 0.0019 0.8752 0.735
Subsidy2 601 0.3576 0.0571 439 0.2849 0.0508 1.3484 1.505
DirectorPay1 601 12.2969 12.3985 439 12.3872 12.5179 1.7442* 1.497
DirectorPay2 601 5.7416 3.8926 439 6.1757 4.3938 1.327 1.816*
Promotion 71 0.4086 0 58 0.431 0 0.2567 0.258
Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
Table 4
Pearson correlation matrix.
Exc_L Gov_Political Debt1 Debt2 Debt3 Subsidy1 Subsidy2 Director
Pay1
Director
Pay2
ROA TobinQ
Exc_L 1.0000
Gov_Political 0.0674** 1.0000
Debt1 0.0231 0.0342 1.0000
Debt2 0.0665** 0.0237 0.7287*** 1.0000
Debt3 0.0435 0.0221 0.6075*** 0.1013*** 1.0000
Subsidy1 0.0710** 0.0273 0.0026 0.0676*** 0.0747** 1.0000
Subsidy2 0.0087 0.0421 0.0202 0.0711** 0.0532* 0.5892*** 1.0000
DirectorPay1 0.1930*** 0.0543* 0.2000*** 0.2451*** 0.0065 0.0540* 0.0807*** 1.0000
DirectorPay2 0.2828*** 0.0418 0.1314*** 0.0939*** 0.0824*** 0.0885*** 0.0627** 0.5135*** 1.0000
ROA 0.1439*** 0.0406 0.3858*** 0.4457*** 0.0436 0.0218 0.0754** 0.3324*** 0.1060*** 1.0000
TobinQ 0.0409 0.0515* 0.1718*** 0.1211*** 0.1091*** 0.0439 0.0465 0.1115*** 0.0602* 0.1688*** 1.0000
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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test. Similarly, the mean pay for chairmen is 12.29 for local SOEs with chairmen of a government background.
The diﬀerence between the mean values of ﬁrms with and without political connections is statistically
signiﬁcant.
The Pearson correlation coeﬃcients for the dependent variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 4.
As expected, the correlation between Exc_L and Gov_Political is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
table shows a positive correlation between Exc_L, Debt2 and Subsidy1, but a negative correlation between
Exc_L, DirectorPay1 and ROA.
5. Empirical analysis
5.1. Government background and excess employment
Table 5 reports the results of model (1). The variables that we want to investigate are signiﬁcantly corre-
lated (as the Pearson correlation matrix of Table 4 has shown), so we introduce the two variables, Political
and Gov_Political. These variables represent political connection and government background respectively.
In this regression, the dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is Exc_L, and in columns 2 and 4 the dependent
variable is Exc_L_Dummy.
Table 5
Government background and excess employment.
Excess employment Total sample (2949) Political connection (1040)
Exc_L Exc_L_Dummy Exc_L Exc_L_Dummy
Constant 3.138 4.644 3.196 4.085
7.47 5.92 4.42 2.81
Political 0.127 0.409
2.78 4.80
Gov_Political 0.137 0.0663
1.98 0.47
Govindex 0.103 0.225 0.145 0.304
5.60 6.59 4.46 4.67
Unemploy 0.0342 0.211 0.116 0.263
0.80 2.69 1.66 1.87
FixedAsset 0.0447 0.181 0.357 0.808
0.38 0.82 1.95 2.13
AssetGrowth 0.486 0.603 0.483 0.0887
1.28 0.86 0.81 0.07
SaleSize 0.0885 0.278 0.0606 0.294
4.32 7.18 1.76 4.14
SaleGrowth 0.0930 0.0251 0.150 0.155
1.31 0.19 1.34 0.68
ROAt1 2.004 3.644 1.247 3.130
4.39 4.25 1.75 2.19
Leverage 0.00903 0.101 0.200 0.726
0.07 0.39 0.96 1.71
ExistAge 0.0116 0.0428 0.00300 0.0444
1.85 3.60 0.27 2.00
Audittype 0.204 0.345 0.183 0.555
2.01 1.85 1.29 2.00
Dual 0.141 0.136 0.0980 0.0665
2.07 1.07 0.86 0.29
FirstShare 0.00315 0.000555 0.000342 0.00145
2.08 0.20 0.13 0.28
Observations 2949 2949 1040 1040
R2 0.0623 0.0649
Adj-R2 or Pseudo R2 0.0561 0.0422 0.0470 0.0475
F-value 10.01 3.64
Note: (1) ,,Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regressions but not reported.
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to excess employment, at a signiﬁcance level of 1%. This means that the general political connections can
potentially help ﬁrms resist government intervention, such as pressure to employ more people. However,
the further analysis in columns 3 and 4 demonstrate that having a chairman with a government background
has a signiﬁcant positive relationship (5%) with overstaﬃng in the politically connected subsample (1040
observations). This indicates that the chairman’s government background is the mechanism through which
the government realizes its intervention for overstaﬃng in local SOEs.
Table 5 also shows that local SOEs with higher government intervention index scores are less likely to sus-
tain excess employment, as evidenced by the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on Govindex. The higher gov-
ernment intervention index score means less government intervention. Local SOEs in regions with weak
institutions are more likely to face the problem of overstaﬃng, which is consistent with the ﬁndings of Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) and Lin and Tan (1999). Table 5 indicates that ﬁrms located in regions with higher unem-
ployment rates tend to hire more employees, as shown by the positive relationship between Exc_L and Unem-
ploy. In addition, the results show that ROAt1 is signiﬁcantly and negatively related to the dependent
variable, which implies that the government tends to intervene to promote overstaﬃng in ﬁrms with poorer
performance, rather than in better-performing ﬁrms.
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employment when chairmen have a government background.
5.2. The eﬀects of excess employment on Local SOEs – chairman level
Prior research indicates that overstaﬃng is negatively related to a ﬁrm’s performance. The above-
mentioned evidence shows that local SOEs tend to sustain excess employment when their chairmen have a
government background. Therefore we ask, what does the chairman gain from this behavior? As previously
discussed, a chairman who promotes overstaﬃng may receive more money or greater promotion opportunities
as compensation for incurring these negative eﬀects on the ﬁrm. This section of our paper will examine the
results of supporting excess employment for the ﬁrms’ chairmen.
Table 6 presents the empirical results on the relationship between excess employment and chairmen’s com-
pensation. Contrary to our initial projections, excess employment is negatively related to chairmen’s compen-
sation at the absolute level. In other words, when a ﬁrm incurs the expenses of overstaﬃng, its chairman does
not enjoy an increase in his/her pay. One explanation for this result may be that our measure of the chairmen’s
compensation is based on the compensation of the top three executives in each ﬁrm, which is not an exact
measurement. However, when it comes to the relative level of chairmen’s payment (as shown in columns 4,
5, and 6), the coeﬃcients of Exc_L on DirectorPay2 are signiﬁcantly positive (1%), just as we predicted in
Section 2.2.2.
Table 6 also shows that in ﬁrms whose chairmen have a government background, the chairpersons them-
selves get much less pay than their counterparts when their companies sustain an overstaﬃng problem. TheTable 6
Excess employment and chairman’s compensation.
Director Pay1 Director Pay1 Director Pay1 Director Pay2 Director Pay2 Director Pay2
Constant 7.509 7.502 7.502 10.42 10.47 10.49
(18.17) (18.17) (18.13) (3.55) (3.58) (3.57)
Exc_L 0.0770 0.0743 0.0740 1.493 1.513 1.537
(4.04) (3.89) (2.16) (11.04) (11.17) (6.32)
Gov_Political 0.0794 0.0792 0.582 0.566
(1.88) (1.72) (1.95) (1.73)
Gov_Political  Exc_L 0.000451 0.0353
(0.01) (0.12)
FixedAsset 0.377 0.365 0.365 0.824 0.734 0.732
(3.59) (3.47) (3.47) (1.11) (0.99) (0.98)
SaleSize 0.263 0.265 0.265 0.854 0.868 0.869
(13.15) (13.24) (13.23) (6.01) (6.12) (6.11)
ROA 3.482 3.506 3.505 15.28 15.46 15.43
(7.92) (7.98) (7.95) (4.90) (4.96) (4.93)
Leverage 0.352 0.356 0.356 0.869 0.841 0.837
(2.66) (2.69) (2.69) (0.93) (0.90) (0.89)
Dual 0.0787 0.0722 0.0722 1.192 1.144 1.144
(1.15) (1.05) (1.05) (2.45) (2.36) (2.35)
FirstShare 0.00635 0.00625 0.00625 0.0619 0.0612 0.0612
(4.29) (4.23) (4.23) (5.91) (5.84) (5.84)
Mshare 31.17 29.73 29.73 17.97 28.56 28.38
(1.74) (1.66) (1.66) (0.14) (0.22) (0.22)
Audittype 0.178 0.190 0.190 0.493 0.575 0.574
(2.05) (2.18) (2.18) (0.80) (0.93) (0.93)
Observations 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029
R2 0.3649 0.3671 0.3671 0.1997 0.1997 0.2027
Adj-R2 0.3555 0.3571 0.3565 0.1878 0.1878 0.1893
F-value 38.80 36.69 34.50 16.85 16.85 15.12
Notes: (1) ,, Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regressions but not reported.
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compensation.
In local SOEs that havemore sales (greater size) and better accounting performance, the chairmen tend to gain
more compensation at both the absolute and relative levels, as shown by the positive coeﬃcients of SaleSize and
ROA on DirectorPay1 and DirectorPay2. This result is consistent with prior results in this research area.
The other part of Hypothesis 2A concerns the chairmen’s prospects of promotion. To study the relationship
between excess employment in local SOEs and their chairmen’s promotion in this model, we introduce only
the ﬁrms that changed their chairmen between 2004 and 2009. Because there may be a dynamic lag in the fac-
tors inﬂuencing the turnover of ﬁrms’ chairmen, we introduce the lagged variables of Exc_L, Gov_Political,
ROA and Leverage. Table 7 provides the results. The results are presented in the ﬁrst column. The term
Exc_L, which is the primary variable of interest, has a negative coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
which shows that a policy of overstaﬃng tends to decrease the chairmen’s promotion opportunities. This
result could possibly indicate that chairmen who practice overstaﬃng had already been promoted by govern-
ments before they were appointed to act as the local SOEs’ chairmen. Furthermore, it should be emphasized
that this sample only includes 120 observations, which may aﬀect the results. Also, the chairmen’s age is neg-
atively related to promotion opportunities, which means that chairmen have less opportunity for promotion as
they grow older. This ﬁnding is also consistent with the promotion trend for younger managers in China.
In the second column of Table 7, we add Gov_Political and ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant relationship
between the chairmen’s promotions and the ﬁrms’ levels of overstaﬃng, although the sign of the coeﬃcient
is negative.5.3. The eﬀects of excess employment on local SOEs – ﬁrm level
Next we test Hypothesis 2B, to investigate whether local SOEs whose chairmen have government
backgrounds receive more bank loans or government grants. In Table 8, we run the regressions to test theTable 7
Excess employment and chairman’s promotion.
Promotion (1) (2) (3)
Constant 15.81 16.24 16.29
(3.10) (3.17) (3.17)
Exc_Lt1 0.402 0.384 0.867
(1.74) (1.64) (1.79)
Gov_Politicalt1 0.541 0.848
(1.18) (1.64)
Exc_t1
 Gov_Politicalt1 0.742
(1.30)
ROAt1 8.340
 8.618 9.916
(1.85) (1.91) (2.11)
SaleSize 0.545 0.555 0.544
(2.28) (2.33) (2.27)
SaleGrowth 0.635 0.688 0.557
(1.03) (1.10) (0.88)
Leveraget1 0.206 0.292 0.122
(0.15) (0.21) (0.09)
Age 0.0713 0.0700 0.0762
(2.22) (2.16) (2.27)
Tenure 0.118 0.120 0.126
(1.44) (1.49) (1.51)
Observations 120 120 120
P-value 0.0019 0.0020 0.0018
Pseudo R2 0.1830 0.1918 0.2038
F-value 29.56 30.97 32.91
Notes: (1) ,, Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regressions but not reported.
Table 8
Excess employment and local SOEs’ debt ﬁnancing.
Debt1 (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.350 0.352 0.351
(4.86) (4.90) (4.91)
Exc_L 0.000388 0.000223 0.000539
(0.12) (0.07) (0.09)
Gov_Political 0.0176 0.0174
(2.44) (2.21)
Exc_L  Gov_Political 0.000454
(0.06)
FixedAsset 0.165 0.162 0.162
(9.14) (8.99) (8.98)
SaleSize 0.0202 0.0208 0.0208
(5.92) (6.08) (6.08)
SaleGrowth 0.00616 0.00581 0.00579
(0.52) (0.49) (0.48)
ROA 0.298 0.303 0.302
(3.82) (3.90) (3.87)
Leverage 0.607 0.609 0.609
(26.69) (26.81) (26.78)
Audittype 0.0264 0.0288 0.0288
(1.77) (1.93) (1.93)
ExistAge 0.00265 0.00263 0.00262
(2.51) (2.49) (2.48)
Observations 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.5270 0.5297 0.5297
Adj-R2 0.5205 0.5228 0.5224
F-value 81.57 76.89 72.02
Notes: (1) ,, Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regressions but not reported.
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ﬁrms’ levels of overstaﬃng are not signiﬁcantly related to the amount of long-term debt the ﬁrms receive from
banks. However, consistent with the ﬁndings of Yu and Pan (2008), politically connected ﬁrms have greater
access to debt than ﬁrms without political connections.
In addition, we use another two variables, Debt 2 and Debt 3, to examine this hypothesis. The results, given
in Table 9, are similar to those shown in Table 8.
We perform OLS regressions to identify government grants that could be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrms’ excess
employment and Table 9 shows the regression results. We ﬁnd that excess employment by ﬁrms is not related
to the government subsidies those ﬁrms receive. The government background variable (Gov_Political) is pos-
itively related to government subsidies, as expected, and the relationship is statistically signiﬁcant. We also
ﬁnd that the regional marketization level (Marindex) is signiﬁcantly and positively related to government sub-
sidies. This ﬁnding indicates that when the local economy develops well, the ﬁrms in these regions are more
likely to receive government subsidies from the local government. Although the ﬁrm’s overstaﬃng scale is
irrelevant to the level of government subsidies, the actual number of employees (Alsale) is statistically signif-
icant and positively related to government grants. This positive relationship may suggest that ﬁrms with more
employees attract more government subsidies, because they help the government with the unemployment rate.
5.4. Additional analysis
The above tests show that governments intervene into local SOEs’ employment decisions by nominating
chairmen who have government backgrounds. The tests also show the eﬀects of overstaﬃng problems on ﬁrms
and on their chairmen. However, we also need to know how these factors inﬂuence the ﬁrms’ performance. To
provide insight into whether and/or how excess employment, debt ﬁnancing and government subsidies inﬂu-
ence a ﬁrm’s labor costs or accounting performance, we conduct further analysis in this section.
Table 9
Excess employment and government subsidies.
Subsidy1 Subsidy1 Subsidy1 Subsidy2 Subsidy2 Subsidy2
Constant 0.000445 0.000345 0.000501 0.497 0.507 0.474
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.73) (0.74) (0.70)
Exc_L 0.000678 0.000686 0.000349 0.0917 0.0925 0.0202
(1.25) (1.26) (0.50) (2.00) (2.02) (0.34)
Gov_Political 0.00108 0.00129 0.115 0.161
(1.71) (1.87) (2.16) (2.77)
Gov_Political  Exc_L 0.000472 0.101
(0.77) (1.96)
Marindex 0.00059 0.00061 0.000603 0.0287 0.0299 0.0294
(3.26) (3.33) (3.31) (1.87) (1.95) (1.92)
Alsale 0.00103 0.00102 0.00101 0.0621 0.0606 0.0587
(3.17) (3.13) (3.10) (2.27) (2.22) (2.15)
SaleSize 0.0000503 0.0000197 0.0000226 0.0159 0.0192 0.0186
(0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.50) (0.61) (0.59)
ROAt1 0.0113 0.0115 0.0118 2.639 2.662 2.725
(1.79) (1.82) (1.86) (4.93) (4.99) (5.10)
Leverage 0.00282 0.00292 0.00288 0.0108 0.000138 0.01000
(1.50) (1.55) (1.53) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06)
FirstShare 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00274 0.00301 0.00304
(3.17) (3.28) (3.29) (1.47) (1.61) (1.63)
Unemploy 0.000869 0.000842 0.000834 0.116 0.113 0.111
(1.36) (1.32) (1.31) (2.15) (2.10) (2.07)
Observations 1017 1017 1017 1017 1017 1017
R2 0.0766 0.0793 0.0798 0.0660 0.0703 0.0738
Adj-R2 0.0637 0.0655 0.0651 0.0529 0.0564 0.0590
F-value 5.93 5.74 5.42 5.05 5.05 4.98
Notes: (1) ,, Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regressions but not reported.
W. Xiongyuan, W. Shan / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 51–74 65First, we perform regressions to examine the factors that inﬂuence the companies’ labor costs. The depen-
dent variable is a continuous variable and we introduce two measurements to proxy for this. The ﬁrst mea-
surement is Total Labor Cost, which is calculated as “cash paid to and on behalf of employees” from the
cash-ﬂow statement divided by total sales. The other measurement is Average Labor Cost, which is calculated
as the logarithm of “cash paid to and on behalf of employees” divided by the total number of employees. In
these regressions, we exclude the compensation and the number of employees who are related to their ﬁrm’s
chairman. The most important independent variable of interest is the ﬁrm’s excess employment (Exc_L). The
control variables (as deﬁned in Appendix A) include the regional macroeconomic variables of GDP per capita
and unemployment rate, and a number of ﬁrm-level variables including the ﬁrms’ percentage of ﬁxed assets in
relation to total assets, asset growth, sales growth, log of total sales, ROAt1, leverage percentage of ownership
by the largest shareholder and age of the ﬁrm. Year and industry dummies are also included in the regression
but not reported.
Table 10 reports the regression results. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Zeng and Chen (2006), the ﬁrms’
scale of overstaﬃng is signiﬁcantly and positively related to total labor costs, and negatively related to the
average labor costs. These results conﬁrm that excess employment is a typical result of the government’s
“grabbing hand,” which does harm to the ﬁrms’ operations. Although excess employment increases the ﬁrms’
total labor costs, it also decreases the average salaries that employees receive.
Table 11 reports the results concerning the relationships between the state owned ﬁrms’ excess employment,
debt, subsidies and accounting performance. We use ROA and TobinQ to measure the ﬁrms’ accounting per-
formance. The independent variables include Exc_L, Debt1, Subsidy1 and several ﬁrm-level variables.
The results in Table 11 are as follows. (1) Consistent with the ﬁndings of Xu et al. (2005) and Xue and Bai
(2008), a ﬁrm’s excess employment decreases its accounting performance, as shown by the signiﬁcant negative
coeﬃcients on Exc_L. (2) Debt ﬁnancing is negatively related to ﬁrm performance, but the relationship is not
Table 10
Tests of labor costs.
Total labor costs Average labor costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.443 0.442 0.440 7.203 7.184 7.192
15.05 15.03 14.94 17.80 17.79 17.78
Exc_L 0.0199 0.0198 0.0235 0.286 0.289 0.298
15.41 15.30 10.21 16.09 16.25 9.42
Gov_Political 0.00321 0.00565 0.0929 0.0863
1.13 1.82 2.38 2.02
Exc_L  Gov_Political 0.00541 0.0145
1.95 0.38
FixedAsset 0.0345 0.0340 0.0343 0.360 0.374 0.375
4.60 4.52 4.57 3.48 3.63 3.64
AssetGrowth 0.0895 0.0893 0.0904 0.242 0.238 0.235
3.64 3.64 3.69 0.72 0.71 0.70
SaleGrowth 0.0139 0.0141 0.0140 0.245 0.250 0.250
3.02 3.05 3.03 3.85 3.94 3.95
SaleSize 0.0172 0.0173 0.0171 0.215 0.214 0.214
12.18 12.20 12.12 11.03 11.02 10.99
ROAt1 0.0240 0.0235 0.0195 0.262 0.247 0.258
0.82 0.80 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.64
Leverage 0.0288 0.0286 0.0290 0.332 0.326 0.324
3.37 3.35 3.39 2.83 2.78 2.77
FirstShare 0.000320 0.000313 0.000305 0.00248 0.00229 0.00231
2.99 2.92 2.85 1.69 1.55 1.57
ExistAge 0.000904 0.000905 0.000827 0.000319 0.000329 0.000537
1.99 1.99 1.81 0.05 0.05 0.09
GDP 0.00851 0.00837 0.00820 0.317 0.312 0.313
2.44 2.40 2.36 6.61 6.53 6.54
Unemploy 0.00564 0.00578 0.00590 0.0274 0.0315 0.0311
1.91 1.96 2.00 0.67 0.78 0.77
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.3998 0.4006 0.4028 0.4388 0.4420 0.4421
Adj-R2 0.3896 0.3897 0.3915 0.4293 0.4319 0.4314
F-value 39.14 37.05 35.40 45.95 43.92 41.58
Notes: (1) ,, Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regressions but not reported.
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the ﬁrm and the government, and therefore hinders ﬁrm performance. (3) Having chairmen with government
backgrounds is positively related to ROA and TobinQ, but not to a signiﬁcant degree. To summarize, the neg-
ative eﬀects of the government’s “grabbing hand” are obvious and the “helping hand” eﬀect is not so obvious.
In both cases, however, government intervention does harm to ﬁrms.
5.5. Robustness tests
One concern with our analysis is the potential for reverse causality. Speciﬁcally, it is possible that the gov-
ernment assigns candidates to ﬁrms with excess employment. The government maintains the ultimate author-
ity regarding appointments of CEOs or chairmen in SOEs and may do so according to its own priorities. In
attempting to mitigate this endogeneity issue, we perform the following three tests.
5.5.1. Redeﬁning political connections
In the previous sections of this paper, we only focus on the political connections of SOE chairmen. How-
ever, the boards of these ﬁrms are often responsible for overseeing managers, especially CEOs, and board
members may also have political connections. Consequently, to account for this type of political connection,
Table 11
Tests of the government’s “Grabbing Hand” and “Helping Hand”.
ROA TobinQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.143 0.146 4.544 4.564
4.82 4.93 14.06 14.05
Exc_L 0.00331 0.00118 0.0308 0.0487
2.59 0.52 2.21 1.96
Debt1 0.00232 0.00159 0.0489 0.0593
0.81 0.28 1.57 0.97
Subsidy1 0.0522 0.0645 0.0652 0.0635
3.96 3.95 0.45 0.36
Gov_Political 0.271 0.137 1.886 1.722
1.97 0.63 1.26 0.72
Exc_L  Gov_Political 0.00643 0.0257
2.39 0.87
Debt1  Gov_Political 0.0222 0.0122
1.31 0.07
Subsidy1  Gov_Political 0.189 0.315
0.68 0.10
FixedAsset 0.0220 0.0205 0.0651 0.0612
2.65 2.47 0.72 0.68
AssetGrowth 0.126 0.124 0.572 0.575
5.45 5.36 2.28 2.28
SaleSize 0.0116 0.0118 0.113 0.113
8.40 8.55 7.52 7.51
SaleGrowth 0.0304 0.0305 0.0394 0.0388
6.87 6.89 0.82 0.80
Leverage 0.105 0.106 0.446 0.445
8.62 8.67 3.35 3.33
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.4429 0.4471 0.4990 0.4994
Adj-R2 0.4246 0.4272 0.4825 0.4814
F-value 24.24 22.53 30.36 27.79
Notes: (1) ,, indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regression but not reported.
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political connections according to the following variables. Boardrate = the number of board directors with
political connections/board size. Boardrate1 = the number of board directors with industry-related govern-
ment background/board size. Furthermore, instead of just focusing on the chairmen’s political backgrounds,
we also examine the CEO’s political backgrounds, and the eﬀect these connections have on ﬁrm employment
levels.
The results are tabulated in Table 12. The regression results in columns 1 and 2 show that the rate of polit-
ical connections on boards is negatively related to excess employment, which means that the more politically
connected board members a ﬁrm has, the lower its level of excess employment. However, when it comes to
columns 3 and 4, the results show no signiﬁcant positive relationship between the proportion of board direc-
tors with industry-related political backgrounds and excess employment in their ﬁrms.
Table 13 reports the results from the examination of the CEOs’ political connections. We ﬁnd that there is
no signiﬁcant relationship between the CEOs political connections and overstaﬃng in their ﬁrms. However,
the subsample shows that the CEOs’ industry-related political backgrounds are negatively related to excess
employment (statistically signiﬁcant), which is a diﬀerent result from that found in Table 5. The results in
Tables 12 and 13 conﬁrm that appointing politically connected board directors or CEOs is not the mechanism
for the government to solve the employment problem. Redeﬁning political connectedness according to board
member or CEO connections cannot substitute for a focus on the chairmen’s political connections in explain-
ing overemployment.
Table 12
Board political connections and excess employment.
Excess Employment Exc_L Exc_L_Dummy Exc_L Exc_L_Dummy
Constant 3.5342 4.4173 2.8553 5.8339
(8.69) (5.63) (5.77) (5.94)
Boardrate 0.5111 1.1934
(2.48) (3.02)
Boardrate1 0.1992 0.5367
(0.47) (0.66)
Govindex 0.1065 0.2397 0.1068 0.2923
(5.84) (7.06) (4.81) (6.85)
Unemploy 0.0358 0.2129 0.0112 0.1248
(0.84) (2.71) (0.22) (1.30)
FixedAsset 0.0391 0.2046 0.2461 0.4947
(0.33) (0.93) (1.75) (1.84)
AssetGrowth 0.4860 0.6486 1.0163 0.9066
(1.28) (0.93) (2.17) (1.02)
SaleSize 0.0902 0.2746 0.0610 0.3371
(4.40) (7.11) (2.44) (6.98)
SaleGrowth 0.0909 0.0171 0.1042 0.0396
(1.28) (0.13) (1.25) (0.25)
ROAt1 2.0207 3.6790 2.3949 4.0312
(4.42) (4.29) (4.41) (3.89)
Leverage 0.0096 0.1061 0.0538 0.3587
(0.07) (0.41) (0.33) (1.17)
ExistAge 0.0111 0.0408 0.0143 0.0710
(1.77) (3.46) (1.98) (4.86)
Audittype 0.1858 0.2894 0.3691 0.4509
(1.83) (1.56) (3.23) (2.11)
Dual 0.1303 0.1073 0.0607 0.1041
(1.91) (0.85) (0.79) (0.72)
FirstShare 0.0029 0.0003 0.0019 0.0017
(1.88) (0.11) (1.08) (0.49)
Observations 2881 2881 1990 1990
R2 0.062 0.056
Adj-R2 or Pseudo R2 0.056 0.039 0.047 0.049
F-value 9.9214 6.1157
Notes: (1) ,, indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and industry dummies are included in the
regressions but not reported.
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To examine the reverse causality problem more deeply, we identify exogenous changes in the ﬁrms’ chair-
men that are not caused by policy reasons. To do this, we divide the total sample into two groups, according to
whether the ﬁrms have experienced a chairman turnover during the 2004–2009 period. Some 343 cases of
chairman turnover appear among the 1500 ﬁrm observations. In Table 14, we present summary statistics com-
paring the employment situations of the turnover and the non-turnover groups. In addition, we test the dif-
ferences before and after a chairman turnover for the turnover group. The cross-sectional mean (median)
values of the ﬁrms’ employment situations are reported, as well as the t-statistic and the Wilcoxon values
of the diﬀerence tests.
To compare the employment situations of the two groups, panel A shows that the level of excess employ-
ment (t = 2.85, 1%) and the absolute number of employees (Z = 4.13, 1%) in the turnover group are sig-
niﬁcantly higher than in the non-turnover group. Panel B shows the results of employment diﬀerences before
and after the chairman turnovers in the turnover group. We can see that the ﬁrms’ excess employment before
the chairman turnovers is signiﬁcantly lower than it is after the turnovers. This is consistent with the previ-
ously demonstrated negative relationship between political connections and excess employment.
We also identify cases among local SOEs in which the previous chairmen were not politically connected and
the new chairmen who replaced them had political connections. Panel C of Table 14 shows that both the
Table 13
CEO political background and excess employment.
Excess Employment Exc_L Exc_L_Dummy Exc_L Exc_L_Dummy
Constant 3.4333 4.6992 2.2465 9.4710
(8.46) (6.00) (2.91) (5.67)
CEO_Political 0.0101 0.2094
(0.20) (2.25)
CEO_ 0.2344 0.5335
Gov_Political (2.30) (2.55)
Govindex 0.1104 0.2505 0.1510 0.2352
(6.06) (7.40) (4.48) (3.49)
Unemploy 0.0311 0.2030 0.0990 0.2645
(0.73) (2.59) (1.22) (1.63)
FixedAsset 0.0298 0.2503 0.3999 0.7102
(0.25) (1.13) (1.86) (1.64)
AssetGrowth 0.5374 0.7954 0.0118 1.5647
(1.41) (1.14) (0.02) (1.02)
SaleSize 0.0875 0.2804 0.0019 0.4984
(4.27) (7.28) (0.05) (6.26)
SaleGrowth 0.0893 0.0177 0.1397 0.1567
(1.26) (0.14) (1.07) (0.60)
ROAt1 2.0008 3.6367 2.8138 3.4772
(4.37) (4.25) (3.28) (2.02)
Leverage 0.0070 0.0825 0.4852 0.6858
(0.05) (0.32) (1.81) (1.26)
ExistAge 0.0112 0.0419 0.0214 0.0858
(1.78) (3.55) (1.69) (3.33)
Audittype 0.1890 0.3132 0.6946 0.7697
(1.86) (1.68) (2.94) (1.64)
Dual 0.1412 0.1891 0.1149 0.0602
(2.02) (1.45) (1.17) (0.31)
FirstShare 0.0031 0.0002 0.0050 0.0068
(2.01) (0.07) (1.66) (1.12)
Observations 2881 2881 749 749
R2 0.060 0.096
Adj-R2 or Pseudo R2 0.054 0.038 0.073 0.083
F-value 9.5804 4.0897
Notes: (1) CEO_Political and CEO_Gov_Political are proxies for CEO’s political connection and government background, respectively.
(2) , ,  Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (3) Year and industry dummies are also included in the
regressions but not reported.
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Panel D focuses on the chairmen’s government backgrounds and shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in employ-
ment levels before or after turnover in this subsample.
Similarly, we test how employment levels change when a chairman with a political background is replaced
by a new chairman with such a background. The results (not reported) show no signiﬁcant diﬀerence for
employment levels for this type of turnover.
5.5.3. Determinants of chairmen’s political ties
In further attempting to mitigate the endogeneity issue, we use a two-stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage we
perform logistic regressions to identify factors that inﬂuence the election of politically connected chairmen.
According to Fan et al. (2007) and Yu and Pan (2008), we control for the following variables. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the chairman is a current or ex-government bureaucrat, and 0 other-
wise. The independent variables, as deﬁned in Appendix A, include regional macroeconomic factors of per
capita GDP, unemployment rate and process of marketization, and a few industry- and ﬁrm-level variables,
including a regulated industry dummy, the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder, ROA and lever-
age. Year dummies are included in the regression but not reported.
Table 14
Univariate tests of employment around chairman turnover.
Turnover group Non-turnover group T-test
Panel A
Exc_L 0.6259 0.5048 2.85
(0) (0) (1.06)
Staﬀ No. 4493 4674 0.68
(2355) (2022) (4.13)
Post-turnover Pre-turnover
Panel B
Exc_L 0.5034 0.7923 4.37
(0) (0) (2.89)
Staﬀ No. 4500 4484 0.05
(2327) (2428) (1.6)
Panel C
Exc_L 0.5169 1.2138 3.14
(0) (0.3206) (3.17)
Staﬀ No. 4748 5739 1.18
(2420) (4202) (2.67)
Panel D
Exc_L 0.3073 0.3299 0.16
(0) (0) (1.03)
Staﬀ No. 4749 2598 1.48
(1951) (903) (1.65)
Notes: (1) Staﬀ No. is calculated as the absolute number of the ﬁrm’s employees. (2) ,, Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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niﬁcantly and positively related to the appointment of politically connected chairmen. These regression results
suggest that when local governments are facing the challenge of meeting economic and employment targets,
they have an incentive to appoint politically connected chairmen. We also ﬁnd that a local SOE is more likelyTable 15
Test of the determinants of chairmen’s political ties.
Political Gov_Political
Constant 53.92 53.04
(0.20) (0.12)
GDP 0.168 0.484
(1.46) (2.49)
Unemploy 0.197 0.193
(2.35) (1.45)
Marindex 0.182 0.126
(6.76) (2.72)
Industry 0.396 0.0457
(3.94) (0.29)
FirstShare 0.000854 0.00886
(0.32) (1.97)
ROA 1.131 1.095
(1.44) (0.87)
Leverage 0.195 0.188
(0.81) (0.49)
N 2949 1040
Pseudo R2 0.0304 0.0133
Notes: (1) , ,  Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year dummies are
included in the regressions but not reported.
Table 16
Regression results of two-stage approach.
(1) (2)
Constant 2.995 2.907
(6.75) (3.76)
Political 0.904
(2.02)
Gov_Political 0.929
(1.81)
Govindex 0.0606 0.137
(1.87) (3.95)
Unemploy 0.0587 0.0744
(1.27) (0.95)
FixedAsset 0.122 0.459
(0.91) (2.17)
AssetGrowth 0.257 0.437
(0.59) (0.69)
SaleSize 0.0859 0.0624
(3.90) (1.65)
SaleGrowth 0.122 0.187
(1.60) (1.54)
ROAt1 2.329 1.534
(4.63) (1.99)
Leverage 0.0186 0.141
(0.12) (0.61)
ExistAge 0.0150 0.00498
(2.22) (0.43)
Audittypee 0.361 0.0932
(2.79) (0.53)
Dual 0.140 0.193
(1.94) (1.47)
FirstShare 0.00379 0.00151
(2.34) (0.51)
Observations 2855 1008
Pseudo R2 1.175 1.1266
Notes: (1) ,, Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Year and
industry dummies are included in the regressions but not reported.
W. Xiongyuan, W. Shan / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 51–74 71to get a politically connected chairman if the ﬁrm is in a regulated industry. This ﬁnding may indicate that
ﬁrms in regulated industries may need more political connections to help them succeed.
In the second stage regression, we use themodel fromTable 5 but include the ﬁrst-stagemodel’s predictions of
the probability of politically connected chairmen. The results of this two-stage approach, as shown in Table 16,
remain qualitatively similar to previously reported ﬁndings. The predicted relationship between politically con-
nected chairmen and excess employment is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (at 5%). As predicted, having a
chairman with a government background is positively and signiﬁcantly (10%) related to excess employment.
6. Conclusions and limitations
This paper explores the inﬂuence of government interventions on listed local Chinese SOEs and speciﬁcally
investigates the aﬀects of interventions to nominate politically connected people as chairmen in SOEs. We
study the role of chairmen with government backgrounds in shaping ﬁrms’ employment decisions and the
eﬀects of overstaﬃng on both the chairmen’s income and the ﬁrms’ operations. As evidence, we use compre-
hensive ﬁnancial and accounting data from 2004 to 2009, together with detailed information on SOE chairmen
and macroeconomic data for local regions in China. After studying the relationship between excess employ-
ment and the chairmen’s government backgrounds, we examine the consequences of excess employment on
local SOEs. We ﬁnd evidence supporting the argument that appointing chairmen with government back-
grounds is the mechanism through which the government intervenes in these ﬁrms’ employment decisions.
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extra staﬀ than chairmen with a professional background in government. This ﬁnding implies that diﬀerent
kinds of political relationships play diﬀerent roles. Second, contrary to our prediction, excess hiring by ﬁrms
does not bring much beneﬁt to the chairmen personally, but does provide ﬁrms with better access to debt
ﬁnancing and government subsidies. This ﬁnding indicates that governments tend to compensate ﬁrms for
helping to reduce the social burden of unemployment. Additional analysis indicates that the negative eﬀects
of the government’s “grabbing hand” are obvious, and the positive eﬀects of its “helping hand” are very weak.
This indicates that government intervention in ﬁrms disturbs their normal operations and reduces the eﬃ-
ciency of resource distribution.
This analysis has very strong policy implications. We demonstrate that appointing chairmen is an indirect
way for the government to intervene in local SOEs. Also, the support that governments oﬀer ﬁrms in return
for overstaﬃng does not signiﬁcantly improve the ﬁrms’ long-term performance. This ﬁnding suggests that the
government should reduce interference in local SOEs and take more eﬀective measures to improve the positive
value of government subsidies.
This study is subject to the following limitations. First, there is a possibility that SOEs with low eﬃciency or
excessive labor forces are more likely to hire ex-government bureaucrats as chairmen. Our two-stage approach
for mitigating this endogeneity issue continues to provide support for the relationship between excess employ-
ment and political connections, but we cannot completely rule out this endogeneity concern. Second, the ﬁrms
selected in our sample are all local SOEs. This may cause a problem of sample selection and limit the gener-
alizability of the results. Prior studies demonstrate that ﬁrms with diﬀerent kinds of ownership tend to operate
in diﬀerent ways. Therefore, future research should examine central government SOEs and private ﬁrms in
comparison with the situation of local SOEs.
Appendix A
See Table A1.Table A1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Age Age of the chairman (continuous variable)
AssetGrowth (Cash paid to acquire ﬁxed assets and intangible assets)/total assets
Audittype Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the auditors issue a modiﬁed audit opinion about the ﬁnancial reports
Dual Dummy variable, which equals 1 when the chairman is also the CEO of the company
ExistAge Number of years the ﬁrm has existed
FirstShare Percentage of shares owned by the largest immediate shareholder
FixedAsset Fixed assets/total assets
GDP Dummy variable, which equals 1 if regional GDP per capita is below the median
Total labor cost (Cash paid to and on behalf of employees – the ﬁrm’s top three managers’ compensation)/total sales
Average labor cost Ln (cash paid to and on behalf of employees/total number of employees)
Leverage Total liabilities/total assets
Marindex This is a comprehensive index that captures regional market development. The higher the index, the more market-
oriented. The data is obtained from the NERI Index of Marketization of China’s provinces, in Fan et al. (2010).
Mshare Percentage of shares owned by the ﬁrm’s management
ROA Recurring income/total assets
SaleGrowth (Total sales in year t – sales in year t1)/sales in year t1
SaleSize Ln (total sales)
Tenure Number of years the chairman has spent in the company
TobinQ The sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities divided by total assets, adjusted for non-
tradable shares. The ratio is calculated as (year-end stock price of A shares  number of A shares + year-end stock
price of B shares  number of B shares + year-end stock price of H shares  number of H shares + book value of
nontransferable shares + total liabilities)/total assets
Unemploy Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the regional unemployment rate is above the median
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